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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Electrical Power Generation/Fuel
Cell Powerplant Subsystem FMEA/CIL
i. 0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 222061 Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, I0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical
Power Generation/Fuel Cell Powerplant (EPG/FCP) hardware,
generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To
preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without
reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL
documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the
proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter EPG/FCP hardware.
The IOA product for the EPG/FCP independent analysis consisted of
sixty-two failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in thirty-two
potential critical items being identified. A comparison was made
of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline dated 15
December 1986 which consisted of forty-three FMEAs and twenty-
three CIL items. The difference in the number of IOA analysis
worksheets and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the different
levels of analysis detail performed to identify failure modes.
The comparison determined if there were any results found by the
IOA that were not included in the NASA baseline. The IOA
analysis had identified seven failure modes, one of which was a
CIL item, for components not covered by the NASA FMEAs. It was
recommended that these failure modes be added to the NASA FMEA
baseline. After discussions with the NASA subsystem manager on
13 March 1987, the IOA recommended failure modes and
criticalities were agreed upon and added to the NASA proposed
changes of the FMEA/CIL baseline. Figure 1 presents a comparison
of the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline with the IOA recommended
baseline and any issues.
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Figure 1 l EPG/FCP FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
mm_
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
w
U
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B.
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3 •0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The EPG/FCP consists of hardware that is required for electrical
power generation and Fuel Cell (FC) product water collection and
distribution in the Orbiter. Reference Figures 2 and 3. The
EPG/FCP consists of the following divisions:
i. The Power Section Assembly (PSA) which is also called
Cell Stack Assembly (CSA) combines hydrogen and oxygen
through an electrochemical conversion to produce
electrical power, water, and heat. Each PSA cell stack
consists of cell plates, pressure plates, end cell
heater/insulator plates, tie rods, and individual cell
voltage harness. Each cell plate is made up of Unitized
Electrode Assembly (UEA) and separator plates. The cell
stack consists of 96 cell plates grouped electrically
into three substacks connected in parallel. The
substack contains 32 cell plates connected electrically
in series. The PSA also contains a cell performance
monitor which provides continuous analog data outputs to
the Orbiter. The outputs transmit individual cell
performance problems or imminent failures. Reference
Figure 4.
2. The Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS) consists of
preheaters, coupled reactant regulator, hydrogen pump-
separator, condenser, hydrogen/water purge/vent line and
oxygen purge/vent line. The RCS heats cryogenic-
temperature gaseous reactants (oxygen and hydrogen) from
the Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
(PRSDS) to an acceptable temperature for delivery to the
coupled reactant regulator. The RCS delivers reactant
gases to the PSA on demand and controls the reactant
pressure within the cell plates. The RCS provides for
purging of inert gases from reactant lines. The RCS
circulates hydrogen for water removal from the PSA and
also prevents water from entering the PSA. Reference
Figure 5.
3. The Thermal Control System (TCS) contains a coolant
pump, thermal control valve, coolant accumulator,
start/sustaining heater, and condenser. The TCS
controls the FCP operating temperatures and electrolyte
concentration. The TCS removes waste heat from the PSA
and heat from the moist hydrogen recycle flow to
condense water vapor. The TCS transfers heat to the
inlet reactant gases passing through preheaters and
rejects heat to the Orbiter vehicle cooling system.
Reference Figure 6.
4. The Water Removal Subsystem (WRS) consists of a
condenser, hydrogen pump-separator, water purity sensor,
water trap and water discharge line. The WRS removes
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Figure 2 - FUEL CELL POWERPLANT SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure I FCP SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 4 - FCP POWER SECTION ASSEMBLY (PSA)
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Figure 5 - FCP REACTANT CONTROL SUBSYSTEM (RCS)
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6 - FCP THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM (TCS)
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water produced in the PSA during the FCP operation. The
FCP produces water vapor which is converted to a liquid
in the condenser. The hydrogen pump-separator
centrifugally separates the water from the hydrogen.
The WRS delivers the water to the Orbiter vehicle
potable water storage system or to the water relief
line. Reference Figure 7.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The three EPG/FCPs are installed in the midbody of the Orbiter
beneath the payload bay liner. Fuel Cell 1 (FCl) is located on
the left-hand side of the payload bay. Whereas, FC2 and FC3 are
located forward and aft respectively, on the right-hand side of
the payload bay. Reference Figure 8. The FCPs PSA receives
the hydrogen and oxygen reactants from the Power Reactants
Storage and Distribution System (PRSDS). The product water from
the PSA is transported to the Environmental Control and Life
Support System (ECLSS) for storage. The waste heat produced by
the PSA is rejected to the Orbiter vehicle cooling system through
the FC40 coolant in the TCS. The FCP receives three-phase ac
electrical power from the Orbiter to power the coolant pump,
hydrogen pump-separator, and the water purity sensor. The FCP
generates dc electrical power which is distributed to the Orbiter
electrical power system. Reference Figure 9.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the hierarchy of the EPG and FCP
systems, respectively. The FCP subsystems are depicted in
Figures 4 through 7.
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Figure 7 - FCP WATER REMOVAL SUBSYSTEM (WRS)
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Figure 8 - FCP LOCATION IN THE ORBITER VEHICLE
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the EPG/FCP hardware initially generated
sixty-two failure mode worksheets and identified thirty-two
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process. In order to facilitate comparison, five additional
failure mode analysis worksheets were generated. These analysis
results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline (22
May 1986) of forty-six FMEAs and twenty-two CIL items and to the
updated (22 December 1987) version of forty-three FMEAs and
twenty-three CIL items. The discrepancy between the number of
IOA and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the different approach
used by NASA and IOA to group failure modes. Upon completion of
the assessment, and after a discussion with the NASA subsystem
manager, an agreement between the NASA FMEAs and IOA failure
modes was reached. Seven failure modes were generated by the IOA
analysis that were not covered by the NASA FMEAs. The IOA
recommended the addition of these failure modes to the NASA FMEA
baseline. After discussions with the NASA subsystem manager the
failure modes and criticalities were accepted and added to the
NASA FMEA baseline.
In the analysis report, the FCP was divided into four sections
according to hardware and function. However, in the assessment
report the FCP has been divided into the four original sections
plus a new section called FCP system (FCPS). The FCPS contains
hardware from all four of the original sections. This new
section was generated in order to facilitate comparison to the
NASA FMEAs.
In the following, the unmapped IOA column is the raw number of
IOA failure modes. The mapped IOA column is the number of IOA
failure modes after they have been mapped into the NASA FMEAs.
The issues column is the IOA failure modes that were unable to be
mapped onto NASA FMEAs.
EPG/FCP IOA IOA
Sections Unmapped Mapped NASA ISSUES
PSA 4 4 3 1
RCS 16 13 13 -
TCS 7 7 2 5
WRS 23 22 22 1
FCPS 12 3 3 -
Total 62 50 43 7
15
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
1.0-WP-VA86001-10, Analysis of the EPG/FCP, 05 December 1986.
Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also
summarized.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
l Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment I
I Component NASA IOA
PSA
ReS
TCS
WRS
FCPS
mm_mm_m_.
TOTAL
_----w
3
13
2
22
3
4
13
7
23
3
43 50
I Issues I
,+ .............. +
I
I 1
I
I 5
I 1
I
I
F
I 7 I
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
+ ...... +
I Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment I
4
1 Component NASA I0A Issues
4
PSA
RCS
TCS
WRS
FCPS
TOTAL
3
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3
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Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
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Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality:
PSA
RCS
TCS
WRS
FCPS
l/l
1
u
1
1
2/1R
3
6
7
2
18
2/2
2
2
÷
3/IR I 3/2R
I
- I -
3 I -
-- I --
s I 1
- i --
÷
8 I 1
+
l TOTAL
+
3/3 TOTAL
4
7
7
D
18
4
13
7
23
3
so I
Of the failure modes analyzed, twenty-four were determined to be
critical items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items
is presented in Table IV.
l TABLE IV Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items l
Criticality: 2/IR
PSA
RCS
TCS
WRS
FCPS
TOTAL
1/l
1
1
1
3
6
i
7
2
2/2
2
3/IR [ 3/2R
I
- I -
- i -
-- I --
- [ 1
- I -
3/3 TOTAL
4
6
II
3
3 17 2 - I 1 - 24 I
+
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers
Component IOA ID Number
PSA
RCS
TCS
WRS
FCPS
FCP-101, FCP-105, FCP-107, FCP-109, FCP-II0
FCP-III TO FCP-II6, FCP-II8 TO FCP-127
FCP-128, FCP-129, FCP-134 TO FCP-137,
FCP-166X TO FCP-167X
FCP-144 TO FCP-165, FCP-168X TO FCP-170X
FCP-104, FCP-106, FCP-108, FCP-II7, FCP-130
TO FCP-133, FCP-138 TO FCP-143
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4.1 PSA Assessment Results
The first assessment between the IOA failure modes and the Post
51-L NASA FMEA baseline produced two issues. The issues
were failure modes on the separator plates (MDAC ID 109) and cell
performance monitor (MDAC ID ii0) that had no corresponding NASA
FMEAs. The new NASA baseline (15 December 1986) did not include
any new FMEAs to resolve the existing issues.
A meeting with the NASA subsystem manager was held on 5 January
1987 and all PSA issues were discussed. The IOA agreed with the
NASA subsystem manager that reactant blockage of the separator
plates was not a credible failure and decided to resolve the
issue by canceling analysis worksheet MDAC ID 109. The NASA
subsystem manager agreed with the IOA analysis that the fail on
mode of the self-test output of the cell performance monitor was
a viable failure mode. This failure mode (MDAC ID ii0) was
submitted to Rockwell for addition to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline
on 16 March 1987 as a criticality 2/IR.
4.2 RCS Assessment Results
The IOA analysis generated seventeen failure modes from the RCS
components. The initial assessment between the RCS failure modes
and the Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline produced four issues.
The four issues were the failure modes on the integrated dual-gas
regulator (MDAC ID 112, 114 and 116) and the hydrogen/oxygen
(H2/O2) flowmeters (MDAC ID 127) that had no corresponding NASA
FMEAs. In the course of reviewing the updated FMEA/CIL list (15
December 1986), MDAC ID 112 and 114, for hydrogen and oxygen
overpressurization respectively, were compared to NASA FMEA 04-
IA-0101-8. The new version of FMEA 04-IA-0101-8 included updated
information to allow comparison and resolve the two issues. The
new NASA baseline did not include any new FMEAs to resolve the
remaining two issues. The IOA agreed with the NASA subsystem
manager that the effect of a purge failure of the integrated dual-
gas regulator was covered by EPD&C/FCP NASA FMEA 05-6M5-2088-I,
and EPG/FCP FMEAs 04-IA-0104-I and 04-IA-0105-I. The IOA also
agreed with the NASA subsystem manager that the effect of
erroneous output from the H2/O2 flowmeters was covered by
EPD&C/FCP NASA FMEA 05-6MA-2012-I. The IOA decided to resolve
the previous two issues by canceling failure modes MDAC ID 109
and 127. The assessment also produced the cancellation of two
RCS failure modes, MDAC ID 124 and 126. The IOA agreed with
NASA's results that a heater could not fail "on". One failure
mode was transferred to the FCPS section.
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4.3 TCS Assessment Results
During the initial assessment, eleven TCS failure modes were
compared to the Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which produced
seven issues. The seven issues were failure modes on the stack
temperature sensors (MDAC ID 134-137), coolant-pressure switch
(MDAC ID 133), start-up heater (MDAC ID 128) and the thermal-
control valve (MDAC ID 141). The updated version (15 December
1986) of FMEA 04-IA-0101-2 included new information to allow
comparison and resolution of the MDAC ID 141 issue, erroneous
output of the thermal-control valve. The IOA recommended that
failure modes for high and low output of the stack inlet and
outlet temperature sensors and the fail open failure of the
coolant pressure switch be added to the baseline of the NASA
FMEA. These five failure modes were agreed upon by the NASA
subsystem manager and were incorporated into the NASA FMEA base-
line 16 March 1987. The IOA agreed with the NASA subsystem
manager that the effect of a failed "off" start-up heater was
covered by NASA FMEA 05-6MA-2035-4.
During the IOA analysis process, failure modes were not generated
for two failures of the coolant return temperature sensor. Two
NASA FMEAs were written on the coolant return temperature sensor
for erroneous output and open or shorted sensor failures. During
the IOA assessment, two analysis worksheets were developed to
cover the two failure modes. The IOA analysis results agreed
with the NASA FMEA findings.
The assessment also produced the cancellation of the failure
mode MDAC ID 129. The IOA agreed with NASA's results that a
heater could not fail "on". Failure modes MDAC 130, 131 and 132
were transferred to the FCPS section.
4.4 WRS Assessment Results
The IOA analysis produced twenty-six failure modes from the WRS
components. The initial assessment between the WRS failure modes
and the Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline produced seven issues.
The assessment also produced the cancellation of four WRS failure
modes, MDAC ID 146, 156, 161 and 162. The IOA agreed with NASA's
results that a heater could not fail "on". Four other failure
modes were transferred to the FCPS section.
The IOA agreed with NASA FMEAs 04-iA-0138-1 and 04-IA-0106-2
which correspond with the IOA failure modes MDAC ID 155 and 163.
The IOA analysis had not considered the water relief heaters as
standby redundant systems. The NASA results had considered the
WRS as standby redundant and had screen B as NA. The updated
version (15 December 1986) of FMEA 04-IA-0101-3 included
information to allow resolution of issues with MDAC ID 139,
restricted flow of the water separator pump. This failure mode
was transferred to the FCPS section. The NASA subsystem manager
agreed with the IOA analysis (MDAC ID 144) that erroneous output
of the pH sensor was a viable failure. This failure mode was
recommended to Rockwell for addition to the NASA FMEA/CIL
19
baseline.
1987.
It was officially added to the baseline in February
The discussion with the NASA subsystem manager resulted in a
decision to change the MDAC ID 149, 152, and 153 analysis results
to agree with the NASA FMEAs 04-IA-0122-3, 04-iA-0119-3, and 04-
iA-0119-2 respectively.
During the IOA analysis process, failure modes were not generated
for two failures of the FCP product water-line. These were
failures of the heater and a gross external leakage failure of
the FCP water lines, fittings and components. The two heater
failures were inadvertently turned on (FMEA 04-IA-0144-3) and
turned on during FCP shutdown (FMEA 04-IA-0144-4). During the
IOA assessment, two failure modes (MDAC ID 168X and 169X) were
developed to cover the two heater failure modes. The updated FCP
FMEA/CIL list did not include FMEA 04-IA-0!44-3 which had been
deleted. The NASA subsystem manager also agreed to delete FMEA
04-iA-0144-4 in agreement with the IOA analysis. Another failure
mode (MDAC ID 170X) was generated for the gross external leakage
failure of the water lines, fittings, and components. The IOA
agreed with NASA's criticality of i/i for FMEA 04-IA-0137-I, but
recommended an analysis be performed to validate that the failure
is credible.
4.5 FCPS Assessment Results
Twelve failure modes were transferred to the FCPS section from
the other four sections. The initial assessment between the FCPS
worksheets and Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline produced no
issue.
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Rev. B, 5-22-85
12. M4001002, JSC Orbiter Full Problem Record Report, EPG
Subsystem, 7-22-86.
13. VS70-945099, Integrated System Schematic Electrical
Power System (EPS) Orbiter Vehicles -099, 103, 104,
7-18-85
14. VS70-945102, Integrated System Schematic Orbiter OV-102
EPS, 9-19-84
15. Magnesium Plate Status Review and Proposed
Investigations to Improve Reliability, IFC, 7-15-86
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16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
EPA Ban on Future Use of Asbes£os Creates Serious
Orbiter Fuel Cell Availability Problem, IFC, 7-16-86
Orbiter Fuel Cell Powerplant Improved Coolant
Accumulator, IFC, 7-15-86
Orbiter Fuel Cell Powerplant Improved Cell Performance
Monitoring, IFC, 7-15-86
Review of IFC Product Improvement Recommendations and
Problems and Concerns, (Orbiter Operational Program),
IFC, 7-16-86
N2 Diagnostic Test Data Review (Comparison of CPM Data
to Single Cell Data), IFC, 7-16-86
Program Review Orbiter Operational Improvement Program,
IFC, 7-15-86
Operational Program Powerplant(s) Failure Review, IFC,
7-15-86
23. Rockwell Specifications for Fuel Cells
24.
a. MC 464-0115
b. ME 363-0042-0003
c. MC 284-0431-0001
d. ME 284-0475-0001
e. MC 363-0037-0001
f. MC 363-0038-0014
g. MC 363-0038-0001-0004
h. MC 363-0038-0003-0004
i. MC 363-0037-0002
J. MC 363-0038-0006
k. ME 449-0160-0003
Fuel Cell
Water Nozzle & Heater
Assembly
Water Pressure Relief Valve
Water Supply Check Valve
Strip Heater EPG
Line Heater H20 Relief Vent
Line
Line Heater Oxygen Purge Line
Line Heater Hydrogen Purge
Line
Strip Heater Hydrogen Purge
Port
Line Heater, FCP Product
Water Line
Temperature Sensors for
Product Water Line, Water
Relief Valve, Coolant Return,
Oxygen Vent Line, Hydrogen
Vent Line and Water Relief
Line
Rockwell International Drawings
a. VS70-450-102
b. vs70-450-I09
c. VS70-450-I12
d. VS70-450-I19
e. V070-454-765
Orbiter Fuel Cell Control Subsystem
Orbiter Fuel Cell Control SubSystem
Orbiter Fuel Cell Control Subsystem
Orbiter Fuel Cell Control Subsystem
Panel - Water Relief Assembly
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w25. Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Drawings
26.
27.
28.
29.
a. 752153
b. 752154
c. 752158
d. 754930
e. 755422
f. 768429
g. 769016
h. 769288
i. 769546
J. 770488
k. 770489-91
I. 770598-99
m. 782900
n. 787900
o. 788400
p. 796798
q. 800634
r. 800635
s. 800636
t. 822998
u. 823098
v. 823100
Plate - Fuel Electrode
Plate - Oxidizer Electrode
Plate - Oxidizer Electrode
Electrode - Fuel Cell Assembly
Plate - Fuel Electrode Terminal
Heater Coolant Start-up
Regulator, Reactant
Accumulator and Strap Coolant Assembly
Filter Coolant (Ref Drawing 14336 501
Change B)
Transducer - Oxidizer Flow
Transducer - Fuel Flow
Components Assembly - Fuel Cell
Power Plant Assembly - Fuel Cell
Power Plant Assembly - Fuel Cell
Power Plant Assembly - Fuel Cell
Components Assembly - Fuel Cell
Cable - Fuel Cell Output Assembly
Wiring Harness, Fuel Cell Input
Wiring Harness, Fuel Cell
Cable Routing - Component Assembly
Component Assembly - Fuel Cell
Power Plant Assembly - Fuel Cell
MDAC IOA EPG/FCP Working Paper No. 1.0-WP-VA86001-10,
12-05-86
NASA-JSC FMEAs and CILs, Pre 51-L
NASA-JSC FMEA and CIL Review Comments for the EPG/FCP
Post 51-L, 5-1986
NASA-JSC FMEAs and CIL, 12-15-86
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ACRONYMS
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AOA
ATO
CIL
CPM
CRIT
CSA
C&W
ECLSS
EPA
EPG
EPS
F
FC
FCP
FCPS
FMEA
FSSR
GFE
HW
IFC
IOA
MDAC
NASA
NSTS
NA
OMRSD
PCI
PRCB
PRSDS
PSA
RCS
RI
RTLS
SM
STS
TAL
TCS
UEA
WRS
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Abort-once-Around
Abort-to-Orbit
Critical Items List
Cell Performance Monitor
Criticality
Cell Stack Assembly
Caution and Warning System
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Environmental Protection Agency
Electrical Power Generation
Electrical Power System
Functional
Fuel Cell
Fuel Cell Powerplant
Fuel Cell Powerplant System
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Flight System Software Requirement
Government Furnished Equipment
Hardware
International Fuel Cells
Independent Orbiter Assessment
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Space Transportation System
Not Applicable
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specification
Document
Potential Critical Item
Program Requirements Control Board
Power Reactant Storage & Distribution System
Power Section Assembly
Reactant Control Subsystem
Rockwell International
Return to Launch Site
System Management
Space Transportation System
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Thermal Control Subsystem
Unitized Electrode Assembly
Water Removal Subsystem
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_-_PS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
%-_nsiti0n to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p-_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or eve-_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at ra_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--n_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens--_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
B-3
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DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i00c-tober 1986, was employe--_--with the
following amp-_ifications a-nd additions.
l •
•
,
,
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out,of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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II.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail•
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
EPG-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
Component age life will not be considered in the analysis.
RATIONALE: Component age life analysis is beyond the
scope of this task.
Cryogenic system pressure to the fuel cell will be assumed
lost if unable to maintain minimum supply conditions of i00
PSI for H2 and/or 02 tanks.
RATIONALE: Minimum requirements definition•
rule definition.
Flight
An 02 cryo tank will be assumed lost if both of its heaters
fail to function (i.e., neither heater will function with
the delta current sensors enabled).
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition•
definition.
Flight rule
An H2 cryo tank will be assumed lost if neither of its
heaters will function•
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition.
definition•
Flight rule
5. An impending loss of all cryo 02 or all cryo H2 tanks will
•
,
be cause to exercise the highest-priority abort mode the
loss/leak will allow•
RATIONALE: Flight rule definition•
Continue nominal ascent if 2/3/4 02 (H2) tanks fail when
flying 3/4/5.
Enter next PLS daily go/no-go if two 02 (H2) tanks fail
during lift-off and on-orbit.
RATIONALE: Flight rules go/no-go criteria.
Ascent abort decision will be needed for any EPG/PRSD/FCP
problems that will not support four hours on-orbit plus
entry time.
RATIONALE: Flight operations rules•
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A fuel cell will be considered failed if the following
conditions exist.
a. An abnormal or unexplained voltage versus current
performance loss of >0.5 volts for a single FC based on
predicted performance data.
b. Coolant pump or H2 pump/H20 separator is lost.
c. Fuel cell stack-coolant temperature >255 degrees
(242.5) degrees F or <175 degrees (182.5) degrees F.
d. Coolant pressure >75 (71.4) PSIA and increasing.
e. Fuel cell unable to discharge water to the ECLSS H20
storage tanks or overboard via the fuel cell H20
relief system.
f. Local KOH concentration >48 percent (45 percent) dry or
<24 percent (29 percent) wet as indicated by fuel cell
stack-coolant temperature, condenser exit temperature,
and current relationship.
g. Fuel cell reactant valve fails closed.
h. Cannot be connected to a main bus.
i. Fuel cell H20 pH high confirmed.
J. Fuel cell 02 reaction chambers cannot be purged.
k. Fuel cell end-cell heater failing on.
I. Fuel cell substack delta volts >150 millivolts and
increasing.
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition.
Loss of one fuel cell is considered cause for priority
flight and abort decision.
RATIONALE: Mission flight rule definition.
Loss of two fuel cells is considered cause for abort
mission.
RATIONALE: Contingency action summary. Flight Rule
definition.
w
B-7
ii.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Loss of three fuel cells is considered loss of life/vehicle
in all mission phases.
RATIONALE: Flight rule definition.
Loss of two fuel cells in the first stage of ascent is
considered loss of life/vehicle.
RATIONALE: SRB loads are too high for one fuel cell to
support. Voltage may go <25v which will
shut down the GPCs.
Although the ECLSS product-water storage is a separate
system from EPG, it will be considered as a failable
redundant product-water relief line for purposes of the EPG
functional criticality scenarios.
RATIONALE: This assumption violates general ground
rule 2.3.2.d but is essential for
evaluating failures associated with the
water relief line.
Filter failure will only be considered in the case of total
flow blockage. Cases of improper/insufficient filtering
will not be considered except where obvious.
RATIONALE: The effect of 'poor' filter performance on
downstream components is beyond the scope
of our efforts.
The start/sustaining heater on the left-hand FCP (FCP #i) is
assumed to be disconnected. Thus, this FCP cannot be
maintained operational at no-load, and will be considered
shutdown if the load cannot be maintained at greater than 2
KW.
RATIONALE: Load needed to maintain operating
temperature. Right hand FCP uses
sustaining heater to maintain temperature
at no-load.
For all "failed open" failure modes for valves which are
normally open, redundancy screen B will be assumed failed.
RATIONALE: The failure is not detectable until the valve
is required to be closed.
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18.
Five 02 and H2 tanks are being used as the baseline
configuration under study.
RATIONALE: The configuration for all redundant components
is being considered for this analysis.
Inadvertent Fuel Cell shutdown during RTLS and TAL abort is
considered loss of crew/vehicle.
RATIONALE: Loss of FCP 1/Bus A is loss of OMS Engine
Purge Capability (required for TAL) and Aft
Compartment MPS Helium Purge Capability
(required for RTLS and TAL).
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
w
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R _ Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N _ Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/26/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-101
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-5
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: i01
ITEM: FUEL CELL
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /1R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[P] [P] CP] CX]*
CP] CP] CP] [x]
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
C / ]
(if different from NASA)
[ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If appl icabi_
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/26/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-104
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-3
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 104
ITEM: END CELL HEATER
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
z
REPORT DATE 03/24/87 C-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FCP-105
04-IA-0101-6
EPG
105
END CELL HEATER
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: I1/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-106
NASA FMEA #: 04-iA-0101-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
106
SEPARATOR PLATES/UEA
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS. "
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
REPORT DATE 03/24/87 C-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ ! /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FCP-107
04-IA-0101-9
EPG
107
SEPARATOR PLATES/UEA
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) , ,
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
I
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-108
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 108
ITEM: SEPARATOR PLATES
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
u
REPORT DATE 03/24/87 C-7
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-109
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 109
ITEM: SEPARATOR PLATES
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
l [ J c J
CP] CP] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REACTANT BLOCKAGE WOULD ONLY CAUSE REDUCED FLOW IN ONLY ONE
OXYGEN PORT. THE FAILURE WOULD NOT CAUSE HYDROGEN OVERPRESSURE
SINCE THE DELTA IN OXYGEN PRESSURE IS MINIMAL. WITH REDUCED
OXYGEN FLOW THE CELL PERFORMANCE WOULD BE REDUCED. THE IOA
ANALYSIS FOR _ACTANT BLOCKAGE mS BEEN CANCELLED BECAUSE OF THE
ABOVE INFORMATION RECEIVED DURING A DISCUSSION WITH THE FUEL CELL
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-II0
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
ii0
CELL PERFORMANCE MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AN EPD&C FMEA, 05-6MA-2019-I, WAS FOUND WRITTEN ON A 3A FUSE
WHICH PROVIDES POWER INPUT AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR THE CELL
PERFORMANCE MONITOR (CPM). THIS FMEA COVERS THE FAILURE OF THE
FUSE NOT THE CPM. A FMEA NEEDS TO BE GENERATED FOR THE ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT FAILURE OF THE CPM. ERRONEOUS CPM OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO MONITOR THE CELL PERFORMANCE OR CELL FAILURE. IF
THE CPM IS LOST, THE AFFECTED CELL CAN BE BUS TIED FOR
PERFORMANCE MONITORING. IF ALL CPM'S ARE LOST, REACTANT
CROSSOVER WOULD BE UNDETECTABLE.
THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AGREED WITH THE IOAANALYSIS FOR THIS
COMPONENT AND WILL RECOMMEND THIS FAILURE MODE TO ROCKWELL FOR
ADDITION TO THE NASA FMEA/CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 04/22/87 C-9
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-III
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
iii
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-II2
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
112
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
r
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET I
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
11/28/86
FCP-II3
04-IA-0101-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
113
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-II4
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-8
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
114
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKS_T
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-115
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
115
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 lIB ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
11/28/86
FCP-II6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
116
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
M. HIOTT
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
CP] CP] [P]
CN] CN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE OF THE REGULATOR TO PURGE DEGRADES THE FUEL CELL
PERFORMANCE. THIS FAILURE IS THE OPPOSITE OF NASA FMEA 04-IA-
0101-8. AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE RESULTING IN THE NEED TO VENT
WOULD CAUSE REACTANT OVERPRESSURIZATION, WHICH REQUIRES FUEL CELL
SHUTDOWN.
THE EFFECT FOR THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COVERED BY NASA FMEAs 05-
6MA-2088-I, 04-IA-0104-I AND 04-IA-0105-I, THEREFORE, THE IOA
ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
w
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET mm
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMPONENTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
[ 1/1 ]
[ 1/1 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
11/28/86 NASA DATA:
FCP-117 BASELINE [ ]
04-1A-0101-4 NEW [ X ]
EPG
117
H2/O2 LINES AND FITTINGS AND ACCESSORY
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IX]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
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ASSESSMENT DATE: i1/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-118
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0104-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
ll8
02/H2 PURGE-VENT LINES AND VENT NOZZLES
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-IISA
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0105-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
118
O2/H2 PURGE-VENT LINES AND VENT NOZZLES
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
n
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-II8B
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0107-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
118
O2/H2 PURGE-VENT LINES AND VENT NOZZLES
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
h
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FPC-II8C
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0108-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
118
O2/H2 PURGE-VENT LINES AND VENT NOZZLES
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
CX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable) _ _ : _!
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-119
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0131-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
119
02 PURGE LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-120
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0131-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
120
02 PURGE LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
FCP-121
04-IA-0132-I
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
121
H2 PURGE LINE TEMPERATURE SENSORS 1 & 2
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
w
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w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-122
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
122
H2 PURGE LINE TEMP. SENSORS 1 & 2
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-123
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0142-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
123
02 PURGE LINE HEATERS (6)
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/24/87 C-25
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-124
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
124
02 PURGE LINE HEATERS (6)
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIG_ ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONAl: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A HEATER c_0T FAIL ON BY ITSELF. FOR A HEATER TO RECEIVE
CONTINUOUS POWER, A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT MUST FAIL CLOSED. THE
FAILURE OF A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT HAS BEEN EVALUATED IN OTHER
NASA FMEAs. _ IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 124 HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-125
NASA FMEA #: 04-iA-0143-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
125
H2 PURGE LINE HEATERS (6) AND NOZZLE HEATERS (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
=
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-125B
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0149-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
125
H2 PURGE LINE HEATERS (6) AND NOZZLE HEATERS (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
w
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
11/28/86 NASA DATA:
FCP-126 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPG
126
H2 PURGE LINE HEATERS (6) AND NOZZLE HEATERS (2)
M. HIOTT
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A HEATER CANNOT FAIL ON BY ITSELF. FOR A HEATER TO RECEIVE
CONTINUOUS POWER, A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT MUST FAIL CLOSED. THE
FAILURE OF A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT HAS BEEN EVALUATED IN OTHER
NASA FMEAs. THE IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 126 HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-127
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 127
ITEM: O2/H2 FLOWMETER
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA .[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEAKING REACTANT WOULD BEIF A FLO_ETER MALFUNCTIONS, THEN
UNDETECTABLE WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE CATASTROPHIC. THE FUSES
WHICH PROTECT THE FLOWMETERS ELECTRICALLY HAVE BEEN EVALUATED BY
NASA FMEAs BUT THE FLOWMETERS HAVE NOT.
THE EFFECT FOR THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COVERED BY NASA FMEA 05-
6MA-2012-I, THEREFORE, THE IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
mm
I
mm
=_
U
m
l
mm
N
D
a
w
REPORT DATE 03/24/87 C-30
g
Z
m
R
mm
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-128
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 128
ITEM: START-UP HEATER
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[
[
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE START/SUSTAINING HEATERS ON FUEL CELL NO. ONE HAVE BEEN
DISCONNECTED. THE FUEL CELL START-UP PROCESS WOULD TAKE LONGER
WITH A FAILED HEATER. THE FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE COULD POSSIBLY
BE DEGRADED DUE TO THE LOSS OF THE SUSTAINING HEATERS THAT
MAINTAIN THE COOLING TEMPERATURE.
THE EFFECT OF THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COVERED BY NASA FMEA 05-6MA-
2035-4, THEREFORE, THE IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-129
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 129
ITEM: START-UP HEATER
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A HEATER CANNOT FAIL ON BY ITSELF. FOR A HEATER TO RECEIVE
CONTINUOUS POWER, A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT MUST FAIL CLOSED.
IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 129 HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
L
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-130
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 130
ITEM: H2/02 PREHEATER
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
CP]
CP]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
=
7 -
REPORT DATE 03/24/87 C-33
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-131
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-2
LNASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 131
ITEM: H2/02 PREHEATER, PUMP, THERMAL CONTROL VALVE,
CONDENSER, FILTERS, START/SUSTAIN HEATER, ACCUMULATOR, FLEXIBLE
INTERFACES, ECLSS HEAT EXCHANGERS
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IDA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
Ix]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-132
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 132
ITEM: COOLANT PUMP
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
o
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-133
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
133
COOLANT PRESSURE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE COOLANT PRESSURE SWITCH SENSES THE HEAD RISE OF THE COOLANT
PUMP AND SEQUENCES THE FUEL CELL START. THE COOLANT PRESSURE
SWITCH ALSO PROVIDES THE INDICATION THAT THE COOLANT PUMP IS
OPERATING. THE FAILURE OF THE COOLANT PRESSURE SWITCH WILL CAUSE
THE LOSS OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT BUT NOT CRITICAL MEASUREMENTS. THE
EVENT INDICATOR FOR THE COOLANT PRESSURE SWITCH IS EVALUATED IN
NASA FMEA 05-6MA-2155-I, BUT THE PRESSURE SWITCH IS NOT. THE
GENERATION OF A NASA FMEA FOR ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 133 IS
REQUESTED TO DOCUMENT THE COOLANT PRESSURE SWITCH HARDWARE AND
ITS LEVEL OF CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-134
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
134
STACK INLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR
M. HIOTT
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE SENSOR DETECTS THE CELL STACK INLET TEMPERATURE. THE SENSOR
OUTPUT IS USED BY THE START-UP HEATER ELECTRONICS. A SENSOR
FAILED HIGH PREVENTS START-UP HEATER OPERATION WHICH SLOWS DOWN
THE START-UP PROCESS. THE START-UP HEATER FOR FUEL CELL NO.
ONE IS DISCONNECTED. THE GENERATION OF A NASA FMEA FOR ANALYSIS
WORKSHEET 134 IS REQUESTED TO DOCUMENT THE FAILURE OF THE STACK
INLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR.
THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AGREED WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS FOR THIS
COMPONENT AND WILL RECOMMEND THIS FAILURE MODE TO ROCKWELL FOR
ADDITION TO THE NASA FMEA LIST.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET II
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-135
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
135
STACK INLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR
M. HIOTT
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] CP] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: _
THE SENSOR DETECTS THE CELL STACK INLET TEMPERATURE. THE SENSOR
OUTPUT IS USED BY THE START-UP HEATER ELECTRONICS. A SENSOR
FAI_D LOW WOULDLOSEONE PATH FOR START-UP HEATER SHUTDOWN. THE
REMAINING PATH TO SHUTDOWN THE HEATERS IS THE STACK OUTLET
TEMPERA_ SENSOR AND ELECTRONICS AND THE MANUAL SWITCHES. A
FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT PATHS COULD CAUSE THE START-UP HEATER TO
FAIL ON WHICH COULD REQUIRE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN. THE GENERATION
OF A NASA FMEA AND CIL FOR ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 135 IS
REQUESTED BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE SHUTDOWN OF A FUEL CELL.
THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AGREED WITH THE IOAANALYSIS AS A 3/3
FOR THIS COMPONENT AND WILL RECOMMEND THIS FAILURE MODE TO
ROCKWELL FOR ADDITION TO THE NASA FMEA LIST.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-136
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
136
STACK OUTLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE SENSOR DETECTS THE CELL STACK OUTLET TEMPERATURE. THE SENSOR
OUTPUT IS USED BY THE START-UP/SUSTAINING HEATER ELECTRONICS. A
SENSOR FAILED HIGH PREVENTS THE START-UP OR SUSTAINING HEATERS
FROM OPERATING. A FAILED OFF START-UP HEATER WILL SLOW THE
FUEL CELL START-UP PROCESS. A FAILED OFF SUSTAINING HEATER COULD
DEGRADE THE FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE. THE GENERATION OF A NASA FMEA
FOR ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 136 IS REQUESTED TO DOCUMENT THE FAILURE
OF THE SENSOR.
THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AGREED WITH THE IOAANALYSIS FOR THIS
COMPONENT AND WILL RECOMMEND THIS FAILURE MODE TO ROCKWELL FOR
ADDITION TO THE NASA FMEA LIST.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ms
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
11/28/86
FCP-137
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
137
STACK OUTLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR
M. HIOTT
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
CP] [P] [P]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE SENSOR DETECTS THE CELL STACK OUTLET TEMPERATURE. THE SENSOR
OUTPUT IS USED BY THE START-UP/SUSTAINING HEATER ELECTRONICS. A
SENSOR FAILED LOW PREVENTS START-UP OR SUSTAINING HEATER
SHUTDOWN, _iCH WOULDIREQUIRE FUEL CELLSHUTD0_. T_GENERATION
OF A NASA FMEA AND CIL FOR ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 137 IS REQUESTED
BECAUSE OF A POSSIBLE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN.
THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AGREED WITH THE IOAANALYSIS AS A 3/3
FOR THIS COMPO_AND WILL RECOMMEND THIS FAILURE MODE TO
ROCKWELL FOR ADDITION TO THE NASA FMEA LIST.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FCP-138
04-IA-0101-3
EPG
138
WATER SEPARATOR PUMP
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
CP]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
11/28/86
FCP-139
04-IA-0101-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
139
WATER SEPARATOR PUMP/WATER CONDENSATE TRAP
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [P] [P]
CP] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
u
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRI T ICALI TY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
11/28/86
FCP-141
04-IA-0101-2
EPG
141
THERMAL CONTROL VALVE
M. HIOTT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FCP-142
04-IA-0101-3
EPG
142
WATER DISCHARGE VALVE
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
CP]
CP]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-143
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0101-3
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 143
ITEM: H20 DISCHARGE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
r
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
W
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-144
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 144
ITEM: PH WATER SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE pH SENSOR FAILS, THEN THE pH CAN BE TESTED MANUALLY WITH
LITMUS PAPER. THE GENERATION OF A NASA FMEA AND CIL FOR ANALYSIS
WORKSHEET 144 IS REQUESTED TO DOCUMENT THE FAILURE OF THE pH
WATER SENSOR.
THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AGREED WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS FOR THIS
COMPONENT AND WILL RECOMMEND THIS FAILURE MODE TO ROCKWELL FOR
ADDITION TO THE NASA FMEA LIST.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-145
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0151-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
EPG
145
PRODUCT WATER LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
146
PRODUCT WATER LINE HEATER (A&B)
M. HIOTT
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A HEATER CANNOT FAIL ON BY ITSELF. FOR A HEATER TO RECEIVE
CONTINUOUS POWER, A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT MUST FAIL CLOSED. THE
FAILURE OF A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT HAS BEEN EVALUATED IN OTHER
NASA FMEAs. THE IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 146 HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-147
NASA FMEA #: 04-iA-0144-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
147
PRODUCT WATER LINE HEATER (A&B)
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-148
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0136-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC iD: 148
ITEM: PRODUCT WATER LINE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
l
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
11/28/86
FCP-148A
04-IA-0136-2
EPG
148
PRODUCT WATER LINE
M. HIOTT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
CP] [P]
CP] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
. o
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-149
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0122-3
SUBSYSTEM-.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
149
WATER SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER RESULTED IN A
DECISION TO CHANGE THE IOA ANALYSIS RESULTS TO 3/IR AND AGREE
WITH THE NASA FMEA. AN EXTERNAL LEAK WOULD FREEZE CAUSING THE
CHECK VALVE TO FAIL CLOSE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-150
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0122-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
150
WATER SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
CP]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-151
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0122-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
151
WATER SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FCP-152
04-IA-0119-3
EPG
152
WATER RELIEF VALVE
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] [P] IF]
[N] [N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DISCUSSIONWITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER RESULTED IN A
DECISION TO CHANGE THE IOA ANALYSIS RESULTS TO 2/2 AND AGREE WITH
THE NASA FMEA. THIS DECISION WAS MADE BECAUSE OF THE UNKNOWN
AFFECTS OF WATER IN THE PAYLOAD BAY.
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-153
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0119-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 153
ITEM: WATER RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CHANGED TO AGREE WITH THE NASA FMEA DUE
TO A DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER. THE WATER
RELIEF VALVE DOES NOT HAVE A REDUNDANT COMPONENT. THE FAILURE OF
WATER VENTING MAY INTERFERE WITH THE MISSIONOR PAYLOAD
OBJECTIVES.
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B
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-154
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0119-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 154
ITEM: WATER RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-155
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0138-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
155
WATER RELIEF VALVE HEATER (A&B)
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE WATER RELIEF SYSTEM IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT SYSTEM, THEREFORE
THE WATER RELIEF VALVE HEATERS ARE STANDBY REDUNDANT. THE
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B SHOULD BE NOT APPLICABLE (NA) BECAUSE OF
PARAGRAPH 2.3.4 b.l.(b) IN NSTS 22206 FOR THIS HARDWARE. THE IOA
ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THE WATER RELIEF SYSTEM AS REDUNDANT,
BUT NOW AGREES WITH THE NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-156
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
156
WATER RELIEF VALVE HEATER A&B
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A HEATER CANNOT FAIL ON BY ITSELF. FOR A HEATER TO RECEIVE
CONTINUOUS POWER, A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT MUST FAIL CLOSED. THE
FAILURE OF A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT HAS BEEN EVALUATED IN OTHER
NASA FMEAs. THE IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 156 HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-157
NASA FMEA #: 04-1A-0125-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
157
WATER RELIEF VALVE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _-_ii_i_i= _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-157A
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0125-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
157
WATER RELIEF VALVE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
[
[
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-158
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0133-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
158
WATER RELIEF LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ;_ VC_: i_: _ "
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
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n
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-158A
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0133-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
158
WATER RELIEF LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] [ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
[ ]
r.__
w
z
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-159
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0109-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
159
WATER RELIEF (VENT) LINE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ADDITION OF THE ALTERNATE WATER LINE HAS MADE THIS HARDWARE
CRITICALITY 3. IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-160
NASA FMEA #: 04-iA-0141-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
160
WATER VENT LINE HEATER A&BAND BARREL HEATER A&B
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-161
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
161
WATER VENT LINE HEATER A&B AND BARREL HEATER A&B
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A HEATER CANNOT FAIL ON BY ITSELF. FOR A HEATER TO RECEIVE
CONTINUOUS POWER, A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT MUST FAIL CLOSED. THE
FAILURE OF A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT HAS BEEN EVALUATED IN OTHER
NASA FMEAs. THE IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 161 HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
11/28/86
FCP-162
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPG
162
WATER NOZZLE HEATER (A&B)
M. HIOTT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N] [ N ] [ N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A HEATER CANNOT FAIL ON BY ITSELF. FOR A HEATER TO RECEIVE
CONTINUOUS POWER, A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT MUST FAIL CLOSED. THE
FAILURE OF A SWITCH OR THERMOSTAT HAS BEEN EVALUATED IN OTHER
NASA FMEAs. THE IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 162 HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
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ASSESSMENT WO_SHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-163
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0106-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
163
WATER NOZZLE HEATER (A&B)
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [NA] [P] [
[P] [P] [P] [
COMPARE [ N /
RECOMMENDATIONS:
] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE WATER RELIEF SYSTEM IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT SYSTEM, THEREFORE
THE WATER NOZZLE HEATERS ARE STANDBY REDUNDANT. THE REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B SHOULD BE NOT APPLICABLE (NA) BECAUSE OF PARAGRAPH 2.3.4
b.2 (b) IN NSTS 22206 FOR THIS HARDWARE. I_ _ _ .......
ADDITION OF THE ALTERNATE WATER LINE HAS MADE THIS HARDWARE
CRITICALITY 3. IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-164
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0150-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
164
WATER RELIEF NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[x]
[ ]
w
REPORT DATE 03/24/87 C-69
NAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-164A
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0150-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
164
WATER RELIEF NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IX]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/28/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-165
NASA FMEA #: 04-1A-0106-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 165
ITEM: WATER NOZZLE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ADDITION OF THE ALTERNATE WATER LINE HAS MADE THIS HARDWARE
CRITICALITY 3. IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
12/23/86
FCP-166X
04-IA-0128-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
166
COOLANT RETURN TEMPERATURE SENSOR
M. HIOTT
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
FCP-167X
04-IA-0128-2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
167
COOLANT RETURN TEMPERATURE SENSOR
M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
L
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FCP-168X
04-IA-0144-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
168
FCP PRODUCT WATER LINE HEATER
M. HIOTT
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ J [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THISFAILURE CAN OCCUR ONLY BY CREW ACTION OR BY SWITCH OR
THERMOSTAT FAILURE CAUSED BY VIBRATION OR MECHANICAL SHOCK. THE
SWITCHAND THE_OST_T HAVE BEEN EVALUATED IN FMEAs 05-6MA-2037-I
AND 04-IA-0151-I RESPECTIVELY. CREW ERROR IS NOT WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF THIS TASK. THEREFORE, FMEA 04-IA-0144-3 IS BEING
RECOMMENDED FOR DELETION.
FMEA 04-IA-0144-3 HAS ALREADY BEEN DELETED BY THE NASA SUBSYSTEM
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-169X
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-0144-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPG
169
FCP PRODUCT WATER LINE HEATER
M. HIOTT
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAN OCCUR ONLY BY CREW ACTION OR BY SWITCH OR
THERMOSTAT FAILURE CAUSED BY VIBRATION OR MECHANICAL SHOCK. THE
SWITCH AND THERMOSTAT HAVE BEEN EVALUATED IN FMEA's 05-6MA-2037-I
AN 04-IA-0151-I RESPECTIVELY. CREW ERROR IS NOT WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF THIS TASK. THEREFORE, FMEA 04-1A-0144-4 IS BEING
RECOMMENDED FOR DELETION.
THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AGREED TO DELETE FMEA 04-IA-0144-4.
r
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/19/86
ASSESSMENT ID: FCP-170X
NASA FMEA #: 04-IA-137-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 170
ITEM: LINE FITTINGS COMPONENTS
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *r_
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A GROSS EXTERNAL LEAK AT OR NE_ THE WATER RELIEF PANEL WILL _
CAUSE LOSS OF PRODUCT WATER FROM THE FUEL CELL TO THE ECLSS. A
GR_OSS LEAK COULD SPRAY THE WATER RELIEF LINE AND PRODUCT WATER_ _
LINE TO THE ECLSS WITH WATER CAU_INGTHEM TO FREEZE INTERNALLY,_ -
THE ALTERNATE WATER PATH TO THE ECLSS WOULD THEN BE USED.
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NASA FMEA
04-IA-0101-2
04-IA-0101-2
04-1A-0101-2
04-iA-0101-2
04-IA-0101-2
04-IA-0101-3
04-1A-0101-3
04-IA-0101-3
04-1A-0101-3
04-1A-0101-3
04-1A-0101-4
04-1A-0101-4
04-IA-0101-5
04-iA-0101-6
04-IA-0101-7
04-IA-0101-7
04-iA-0101-8
04-IA-0101-9
04-IA-0104-I
04-IA-0105-I
04-IA-0106-I
04-IA-0106-2
04-IA-0107-I
04-iA-0108-1
04-iA-0109-1
MDAC
ID
108
130
131
132
141
104
138
139
142
143
106
ll7
i01
105
ll3
ll5
iii
107
118
118
165
163
ll8
118
159
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
SEPARATOR PLATES
H2/02 PREHEATER
H2/02 PREHEATER, PUMP,
THERMAL CONTROL VALVE,
CONDENSER, FILTERS,
START/SUSTAIN HEATER,
ACCUMULATOR
COOLANT PUMP
THERMAL CONTROL VALVE
END CELL HEATER
WATER SEPARATOR PUMP
WATER SEPARATOR
PUMP/WATER CONDENSATE
TRAP
WATER DISCHARGE VALVE
H20 DISCHARGE LINE
SEPARATOR PLATES/UEA
H2/02 LINES AND FITTINGS
AND ACCESSORY COMPONENTS
FUEL CELL
END CELL HEATER
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS
REGULATOR
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS
REGULATOR
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS
REGULATOR
SEPARATOR PLATES/UEA
02/H2 PURGE-VENT LINES
AND VENT NOZZLES
02/H2 PURGE-VENT LINES
AND VENT NOZZLES
WATER NOZZLE
WATER NOZZLE HEATER
(A&B)
02/H2 PURGE-VENT LINES
AND VENT NOZZLES
02/H2 PURGE-VENT LINES
AND VENT NOZZLES
WATER RELIEF (VENT) LINE
D-I
FAILURE MODE
COOLANT LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED COOLANT
FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAK OF
TSC COOLANT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
FAIL OFF
DEGRADED PERFORMANCE
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAIL CLOSED
RESTRICTED FLOW
REACTANT LEAKAGE TO
ORBITER (EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE)
REACTANT LEAKAGE TO
ORBITER (EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE)
LOSS ELECTRICAL
CONTACT IN THE
POWER SECTION
FAIL ON
H2 STARVATION
02 STARVATION
GROSS VENTING
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
RESTRICTED FLOW
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAIL OFF
RESTRICTED FLOW
RESTRICTED FLOW
RESTRICTED FLOW
NASA FMEA
04-IA-0119-2
04-IA-0119-3
04-IA-0122-I
04-IA-0136-I
04-IA-0136-2
04-IA-0150-I
04-IA-0150-2
04-IA-0137-I
MDAC
ID
153
152
151
148
148
164
164
170
ITEM
WATER RELIEF VALVE
WATER RELIEF VALVE
WATER SUPPLY CHECK
VALVE
PRODUCT WATER LINE
PRODUCT WATER LINE
WATER RELIEF NOZZLE
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
WATER RELIEF NOZZLE
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
LINE FITTINGS
COMPONENTS
D-2
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CHECK
RESTRICTED FLOW
(EXTERNAL LEAKAGE)
RESTRICTED FLOW
(EXTERNAL LEAKAGE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
ERROENOUS OUTPUT
GROSS EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
m
=_
[]
|
B
[]
m
m
E
i
I
B
|
|
m
L _
[]
m
m
L_
- 7
_s
=-
m
APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
i0, Analysis of the EPG/FCP, (05 December 1986). Prior results
were obtained independently and documented before starting the
FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis was
performed to address failure modes not previously considered by
the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being analyzed,
parent assembly and function performed. For each failure mode
possible causes are identified, and hardware and functional
criticality for each mission phase are determined as described in
NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of _FMEA and CIL, i0
Oc---_ber 1986. Failure mo e_effects are described at the bo-_tom
of each s-h-e-etand worst case criticality is identified at the
top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA - Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
p = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not AppliCable
r
E-I
r
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
166 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COOLANT RETURNTEMPERATURE SENSOR
FAIL OPEN OR SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME449-0160-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED TEMPERATURE SENSOR CAUSES LOSS OF MEASUREMENT. THE
FAILURE CAN BE DETERMINED BY A CONSTANT LOW OR HIGH SCALE.
NORMAL STACK OUTLET TEMPERATURE AND A NORMAL CONDENSER EXIT
TEMPERATURE CAN BE USED TO INDICATE A NORMAL COOLANT RETURN
TEMPERATURE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
167 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COOLANT RETURN TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME449-0160-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED TEMPERATURE SENSOR CAUSES LOSS OF MEASUREMENT. A NORMAL
STUCK OUTLET TEMPERATURE AND A NORMAL CONDENSOR EXIT TEMPERATURE
CAN BE USED TO INDICATE A NODAL COOLANT RETURN TEMPERATURE AND A
FAILING TEMPERATURE SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
168 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FCP PRODUCT WATER LINE HEATER
INADVERTENTLY TURNED ON DURING FCP OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4 ) WRS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_c ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/_ ....
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC363-0038-0006
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ACCELERATION, SWITCH
FAILURE, THERMOSTAT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE C_ OCCUR ONLY BY CREW ACT I_QN_ORBYSWITCHOR
THERMOSTAT FAILURE CAUSED BY VIBRATION OR MECHANICAL SHOCK. THE
SWITCH AND THERMOSTAT HAVE BEEN EVALUATED IN FMEAs 05-6MA-2037-I
AND 04-iA-0151-i RESPECTIVELY. CREW ERROR IS NOT WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF THIS TASK. THEREFORE, FMEA 04-iA-0144-3 IS BEING
RECOMMENDED FOR DELETION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
169 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FCP PRODUCT WATER LINE HEATER
BOTH ELEMENTS TURNED ON DURING FCP SHUTDOWN
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4 ) WRS
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC363-0038-0006
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, SWITCH FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE CAN OCCUR ONLY BY CREW ACTION OR BY SWITCH OR
THERMOSTAT FAILURE CAUSED BY VIBRATION OR MECHANICAL SHOCK. THE
SWITCH AND THERMOSTAT HAVE BEEN EVALUATED IN FMEAs 05-6MA-2037-1
AND 04-IA-0151-I RESPECTIVELY. CREW ERROR IS NOT WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF THIS TASK. THEREFORE, FMEA 04-IA-0144-4 IS BEING
RECOMMENDED FOR DELETION.
m
REFERENCES:
_z
r_
REPORT DATE 01/23/87 E-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 170 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINE FITTINGS COMPONENTS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
V070-454110-124
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN EXTERNAL LEAK AT A PRODUCT WATER LINE (BEFORE THE WATER RELIEF
PANEL) CAUSES LOSS OF PRODUCT WATER FROM THE FUEL CELL TO THE
ECLSS. THE FUEL CELL WOULD BE SHUTDOWN DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF
FREEZING THE LINE. A LEAK COULD SPRAY THE TWO REMAINING
PRODUCT WATER LINES CAUSING THEM TO FREEZE INTERNALLY. THIS
WOULD RESULT IN FLOODING OF ALL FUEL CELLS.
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APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Resolution/Issue/Rationale Codes
Code
1
2
3
4
Definition
IOA Issue.
IOA recommends generating a FMEA for the subject
failure mode.
IOA generated a non-credible failure mode.
IOA generated a failure mode covered by EPD&/C.
F-I
APPE_ IX F
NASA FI,EATO IOAWORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/RECOIVICENDATIONS
., .,.
I IDENTIFIERS I] NASA ,," IOARECOMNIENDATIONS* I
II-- II
I NASA ', IOA " CRIT ISCREENS IICRIT I SCREENS ' OTHER I ISSUEI
........ II -- I
I FMEANtlMBER I ASSESS_NT NI.IIWBER,,"I-IWIFIA B C IIHWIF I A B C I (SEELEGENDCODE) I I
II I I I i== I I
I I FCP-I09 II I I II I I 13 I
I I FCP-110 II I I i,"2/IR IP P P I I,2 I X
I IFCP-116 ,,1'I ,' ,," I ', I 4 I
I IFCP-124 II I I I', I I 13 I
I IFCP-126 II I I Ii, I I IS I
I I F_-127 ,,l' / ,' ,," / I 1 4 I
I I FCP-128 II / I II / I 1 4 I
I I F_-129 I', I I I', / I I 3 I
I I FCP-133 II I I II 3/3 INA NA NAI I,2 I X
I IFI_-134 ,," I I I',3/3 [NANANA I I,2 ,' X
I IFCP-135 I', I I I',313 ',NANA NA I I,2 I X
I IF_-138 II I I II 813 INA NA NA I I,2 I. X
I IFCP-137 II I I II 313 INA NA NA I I,2 I X
I IFOP-144 II I I II 313 INA NA NA I I,2 I X
I IFCP-14B ,," I ,' ,," I ,' I 3 I
l I FCP-156 II / I ,," / I I 3 I
l I FCP-161 II / I ",, / I I 3 I
I I FCP-162 ,," I I ,,,, I I I 3 I
I 04-1A-0101-2 I FCP-108 II 2/IR I P P p ,," / I ,' I
I I FCP--i30 ,," 2tlR I P P P II I I I I
I I FCP-131 ,," 2Ill I P P P II I I I I
I I FCP-132 ,," 2/1R I P P P II / I I I
" / ' ' II I FCP-141 ,,"2/1R I P P P ,, , ,
', 04--1A-0101-3 I FCP-104 II 2/IR ',P P P ,," / ,' I I
I I FCP-138 II 2/IR I P P P ,," / I I I
I I FCP-139 ,," 2/IR I P P P II t I I I
I I FCP-142 ",,2/IR IP P P II I ,' ,' I
' I FCP-143 " 2JIR ',P P P II / ' ' II II I I
I 04-1A-0101-4 I FCP-106 II 111 I NAI,IA NA ,," / l' I I
I I FCP-117 II 1/1 I NAHANA ,," / ,l' ,' I
I 04-tA-0101-5 I FCP-101 II 2Ill I P P P ,," t I I I
I 04-1A-0101-6 I FCP-105 II 2../1RI P P P ,," / I I I
I 04-1,4-0101-7 I FCP-113 ,, 2/1R I P P P II / I I I!l
I I F_-115 II 2/1R I P P P ,," / ,' ,' ,'
I 04-1A-0101-8 I F_-Ill ,," 2/IR I P P P II / I I I
I I FCP-112 II _ll I P P P II I I I I
I I FCP-114 ",, 2/IR I P P P ii I ,' ,' I
I 04-IA-0101-9 I FCP-I07 ,," 111 I NANANA II I I I I
I 04--1A-0104-1 I FCP-118 I', 2/1R I P P P II / I I I
I 04-1A-0105-1 I FCP-118A ,," 2/IR I P P P II i I I .I
I 04-IA-0100-I I FCP-165 II 2/IR IP NAP II I I I I
I I ,," I II I I I
........... == ii _ _._i ............ =====--===-==--'=-==..... =....... ======--=====i _--_I_=Zll I=IIIi= =IIII _ I _- I=
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] IDENTIFIERS :: NASA :: IDA RECOMME_ATIONS* :
: ",, ::' :
: NASA ] IOA ,,l' GRIT ] SCREENS]: GRIT : SCREENS] OTHER { ISSUE:
] FMEANUMBER I ASSESSMENTUMBER]] _/F {k B C ]{ HW/I: { A B C ] (SEELEGENDCODE) I ]
I........... ]............. II ........ I' -- --' ..... ' =='
I 04-IA-0106-2 ] FCP-163 :1 2/IR I P HAP :1 / 1 ] 1 I
] 04-IA-0107-I I FCP-118B 11 2/IR I P P P ,," I 1 1 1 1
: 04-IA-0108-I : F_-I18C 11 2/IR : P P P ,," / ] .: 1 :
: O4-1A-OI09-1 : FCP-159 :[ 2/IR : P HAP ,," / { : : :
: 04-IA-0119-I ] FCP-154 :] 3/IR ] P HAP I," / : : ] ]
: 04-1A-0119-2 : FCP-153 ][ 2/2 ] HAHAHA ]: / ] ] : :
] 04-IA-0119-3 ] FC?-152 ]{ 2/2 IHA HANA ,," / ] I I :
] 04-1A-0122-1 : FCP-151 ]] 3/_ : P F P ,," / : : ] :
I D4-1A-0122-2 ', FCP-1,50 I{ 3/1R I P P P ,," / ', I ', I
', 04--1A-0122-3 I FCP-149 I{ 3/1R I P P P ]I / ', I I I
', 04-1A-0125-I I FCP-157 I] 3/3 I HAHAHA ,," / I I I. ]
', 04-IA-0125.-2 [ FCP-157A ]: 3/3 I HAHAHA ,,l' / I I : :
: 04-1A-0128-1 : FCP-166X :: 3/3 ] HANAHA1,,, / : ] : :
] 04-1A-0128-2 I FCP-167X ]] 3/3 ] HAHAHA"j, / = ] I ]
] 04-1A-0131-1 [ FCP-119 ]: 3/3 ] HAHAHA ]I / I ] : ]
] 04-IA-0131-2 I FC:P-120 I] 3/3 ] HANAHA ][ / I ] I ]
: 04-IA-0132-I ',FCP-121 II 3/3 { HAHAHA ,," / I I I I
: 04-IA-0132-2 I FCP-122 II 3/3 : HAHAHA ,," / I I : ]
] 04-IA-0133-I : FCP-158 ]] 3/3 : HAHAHA I111 / ] : : :
: 04-IA-0133-2 ]FCP-158A ,,"3/3 : NAHANA ]: / ,' : : ,'
I 04-IA-0136-I ]FCP-148 ',:2/IR I P P P ,," / I I I :
: 04-IA-0136-2 ] FCP-148A II 2/1R ] P P P ,," / I I I {
" / I : : :: 04-IA-0138-I ',FCP-155 ,,"3/IR ] P HA P ,,
I 04-1A-0141-1 ] FCP-160 II 3/1R I P P P ,," / ', I : I
I 04-IA-0142-I ] FCP-123 ,,"3/IR I P P P :I / ] I I I
: 04-1A-0143-1 : FCP-125 ]: 3/1R : P P P :: / I : I :
] 04-IA-0144-I ] FCP-147 :] 3/3 :HA HANA ,," / ] ] : :
I 04-1A-0144-3 ] FCP-168X ]: 3/3 I HAHAHA ,," / l l l :
I 04-IA-0144-4 I F'_-169X I I 3/3 I HAHAHA ,," / l l l l
I 04-IA-0149-I ] F_-12_ I I 3/IR ] P P P ,," / l l ] ]
] 04-1A-0150-1 ] FCP-164 I I 2/1R ] P P P ,," / ] l : ]
',04-IA-0150-2 : FCP-164A ]l Z/IR : P P P ,," / l ] : ',
104-IA-0151-I I FCP-145 I I 3/3 ] HAHANA ,," / l I : ]
I 04-IA-137-I I FCP-17_ ,,"I/I ] NA HA NA I: / l ] : I
: : :', ] ,," ] I : I
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